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THE

COMMERCE

CLAUSE,

FEDERALISM,

AND

ENVIRONMENTALISM: AT ODDS AFTER OLIN?
LYDIA

B. HOOVER*

"The powers delegated.., to the federal government, are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the state
governments, are numerous and indefinite."'
- James Madison

"[The natural world] is built of a series of inter-relationships
between living things, and between living things and their
environment. You can't just step in with some brute force

and change one thing without changing a good many others."2
-

Chief Seattle

INTRODUCTION

America is a nation that was founded on the idea of a separation of
powers between the federal and the state governments. This division of
power has been a source of conflict between the two levels of government.3
The conflict, however, was seen as necessary in order to preserve the values

Ms. Hoover received her B.A. in Political Science from The Johns Hopkins

University in 1991 and expects to receive her J.D. from the College of William
and Mary School of Law in 1998.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 237-38 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
2 C. B. GARTNER, RACHEL CARSON (1983), reprinted in PENELOPE REVELLE
& CHARLES REVELLE, THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: SECURING A SUSTAINABLE

FUTURE 9.(1992).
See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1522 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
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of federalism 4 and the liberty of the American people.' Over two centuries
have passed since the drafting of the Constitution. The time that has passed
has not demonstrated, however, a similar passing or ebbing of the conflict
between the state and national governments. Indeed, in recent years, there
has been a resurgence of states' rights claims in the court systems.6 In two
recent Supreme Court decisions, the Court decided in favor of the states and
limited the reach of federal power.7 The conflicts and tensions revolving
around the ideal of federalism have spread to other areas of concern as well.
Even to those not interested in the structure of government or in the
Framers' contribution to political science vis-A-vis the creation of a federal
system, federalism is linked inextricably with any area of concern that has
been the focus of both federal and state laws and regulations. The area of
focus of this Note is environmentalism.8 Generally, the public's knowledge
of environmental issues has increased steadily over the decades. This

6

See infra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1522.
See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that Congress

exceeded its Commerce Clause authority, and thereby its delegated powers in
attempting to regulate possession of a gun in a local school zone); New York v.

United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that a federal provision requiring
states to either take title to or regulate waste according to federal law was outside
of Congress' enumerated powers and violative of the Tenth Amendment); Printz
v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994) (stating that Brady Act
provisions requiring state law enforcement to carry out background checks on
handgun applicants violates the powers delegated to Congress in Article I, Section
8 and under Amendment X of the U.S. Constitution, and thereby violates the
separation of powers between the state and federal governments), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, dismissed in part by Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996). The plaintiffs in these suits reiterate
the Anti-Federalists' concerns about the people's potential loss of local control
and about the necessity of decentralized government to democratic self
government. See KENNETH M. DOLBEARE, AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 134
(2d ed. 1989).
' See generally Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624; New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144.
8

The term "environmentalism" is used broadly here to encompass all ideas

relating to either preservation or conservation of the natural world.
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awareness has led to what some have referred to as an "environmental
consciousness," composed of thought and action of individuals and groups,
trying in different ways to have a positive effect on the natural world. 9
With regard to many environmental concerns, legislatures have
responded by promulgating laws with the purpose of either protecting or
remedying the problems of the natural environment.'0 The question of
federalism arises once these laws are made. At this point when federalism
issues are triggered, one must question whether Congress has the power to
make such a law" and whether the law violates the powers reserved to the
states. 12
In exploring environmental laws under the context of federalism,
environmentalists and legal scholars may have conflicting opinions as to what
the state and federal governments should do, or are able to do, with respect
to environmental laws. This conflict arises when faced with questions about
the constitutionality of federal regulations and when determining the best
means to effect environmental protection ends in the face of federalism
realities as opposed to federalism ideals.
Of particular interest in this context are the recent decisions rendered
in United States v. Olin Corp. 3 and ACORN v. Edwards. 4 The Olin court,

See ANDREW JAMISON ET AL., THE MAKING OF THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSCIOUS-NESS:

A COMPARATIVE

STUDY OFTHE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

IN SWEDEN, DENMARK AND THE NETHERLANDS iX-X

(1990).

" For examples of federal laws, see the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.. §§
1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33

U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671q (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 &
Supp. 1 1995).

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
I?

'3

See id. amend. X.
927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).

81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996), petitionbJr cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3110
(U.S. July 22, 1996) (No. 96-174).
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in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, 5 held that the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act' 6 ("CERCLA")
was not retroactive. The court further found that the application of CERCLA
to the facts of the case exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the
Commerce Clause, and thereby created a separation of powers problem.' 7
The Olin ruling, which came after both United States v. New York 8 and
United States v. Lopez,' 9 is the first court to rule against the application of
CERCLA on the basis that Congress lacked Commerce Clause authority.2"
In another environmental law case, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Safe
Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") provision requiring states to establish
remedial action programs for lead removal from school drinking water
systems2 1 was violative of the Tenth Amendment. 22 This Note focuses on
these lower court decisions considered in light of the progression of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of both the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment, and the future of environmental law.
Part I discusses federalism and the Tenth Amendment and how such
decisions have progressed and culminated in the New York v. United States
decision. Part II focuses on the Commerce Clause and the progression of
Supreme Court views through United States v. Lopez. Part III gives a general
history of environmentalism and an overview of some important
environmental laws. Part IV explains the link between the Commerce Clause
and the Tenth Amendment, paying particular attention to what this linkage

See generally United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
1642 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
'7
IS
q

See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1503.
505 U.S. 144.
115 S. Ct. 1624.

See Superfund: Court Refuses to Apply CERCLA Retroactively, Says No
Authority to Address Intrastate Cleanup, [27 Current Developments] Env't Rep.
(BNA) 386-88 (May 31, 1996).
2' See 42 U.S.C. § 300j-24 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
22 See ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996).
20
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and recent decisions mean to the future of environmental laws. Finally, Part
V concludes that from a legal standpoint, environmental statutes may be in
jeopardy under current Commerce Clause analysis, but this does not
necessarily mean that the environment will be jeopardized.
I. FEDERALISM AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT

The Tenth Amendment states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."23 The words indicate a
federal form of government, divided between a national government and the
states. The meaning, however, is not as clear as the words. The meaning
depends on whether an originalist approach or an evolutionary approach is
taken in the reading of the Constitution and whether the Tenth Amendment
is considered to be a mere tautology or something more.24
A. Federalism
The Constitution is the product of a people who deliberately
constructed the kind of government under which they wished to live.25 Not
wanting an overly strong central government or a mere confederation, the
Framers of the Constitution attempted to create one effective common
government through a division of powers between a central government and
the states.26 The granting of certain powers to the central government, with

23 U.S.

24
25
26

CONST. amend. X.

See infra Part I.A. 1-2.
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 183 (1960).
See id. at 184. Lord Acton pointed out:
Of all checks on democracy, federalism has been the most
efficacious and the most congenial .... The federal system
limits and restrains sovereign power by dividing it, and by
assigning to Government only certain defined rights. It is the
only method of curbing not only the majority but the power of
the whole people, and it affords the strongest basis for a second
chamber, which has been found essential for security for

740
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others retained by the states, was done to set an effective limit on both
27
spheres of government.
1. Originalism
The intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to secure a form of
government that would allow the spheres of federal government and state
government to operate both independently and together; the primary
motivation was securing the freedoms of the people. 8 The Framers
particularly were concerned with the practicalities involved in the
implementation of the new system of dual sovereignty and how that dual
system could promote three complementary objectives: securing the public
good, protecting private rights, and preserving the spirit and form of popular
government.29
In order to secure the public good, the Framers looked to
decentralized government because smaller units of government are better able
to further the interests of the people.3" Decentralized decision-making also
is better able to reflect the diversity of interests of the individuals in different
parts of the nation. 3' The allocation of decision-making to the smaller
governments prevents attempts by outside communities to take advantage of
their neighbors," and it allows for innovation and competition among the
states, thereby preventing a monopoly of power by one central government.33

freedom in every genuine democracy.
John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, May's Democracy in Europe, in THE
HISTORY OF FREEDOM AND OTHER ESSAYS 98 (John Neville Figgis & Reginald
Vere Laurence eds., London, MacMillan 1907).
27 See HAYEK, supra note 25, at 184.
28 See DOLBEARE, supra note 6, at 97.
2' See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1492 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER,FEDERALISM:
THE FOUNDERS'DESIGN (1987)).
80

See id. at 1493.

3'See id.

See id.
"' See id.

12
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James Madison was a proponent of state power in the area of
individual liberties, noting that state and local governments can preserve
individual liberties better than a central national government.34 Madison
feared a tyranny of the majority and felt that this tyranny would be worse on
a national level.35 States allow for more liberty because people are able to
move between them and choose the state having the laws best suited to
them.36 In addition, the separation or diffusion of power between the
governments is a check against any government from becoming too strong.37
The Framers looked to a federal system in order to preserve the spirit
and form of popular government. They feared that a strong national government would lead to another type of despotic rule over the country.38 To allay
this fear, the Framers intended the states to help enforce the laws in order to
provide a government closer to the people and to cultivate public
spiritedness. 39 In short, federalism was seen as a way to preserve individual
liberties while enjoying the security of a united nation under a centralized
government as an anchor of strength.
2. Evolutionary or Modern Approaches
Those favoring a more evolutionary approach do not necessarily agree
with the Framers' idea of federalism. Under the political process approach,
the political process is looked upon as the protector of rights and freedoms.4"
The officials elected to Congress from the individual states are supposed to

See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 41-

48.
s See id. at 44.

See McConnell, supra note 29, at 1503.
7 See id. at 1504-05.
s See id. at 1508.
s See id.
40 See D. Bruce La Pierre, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism Redux:
36

Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH.

U. L.Q. 779, 787 (1982); Vince Lee Farhat, Note, Term Limits and the Tenth
Amendment: The PopularSovereignty Model of Reserved Powers, 29 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1163, 1168 (1996).
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act as a check on federal power because their concerns lie with the interests
of the state from which they were elected. 4' Proponents of this approach
subscribe to the notion that members of Congress still have in mind the best
interests of their individual states when they are in the halls of Congress
drafting national laws.42
The political process approach, however, cannot be reconciled with
the ideal of federalism. Thomas Jefferson, in speaking of concentrating
power not in the executive, but in the national legislature, pointed out that
such a concentration of power in many hands could be as oppressive as one. 3
To allow the national legislature to mimic the philosophies and decisions of
an individual state defeats the purpose of having a federal system of
government. The political process approach, however, should not be taken
as the modem view of federalism, at least not by the Supreme Court.
There is, however, the approach that has been referred to as "new
federalism."" Under this approach, two themes have emerged: reverence
toward state sovereignty and protectiveness of traditional state functions.45
This approach of the Supreme Court has been noted to have emerged in
Justice O'Connor's opinion in New York v. United States and has continued
46
to evolve through the Court's elaboration in United States v. Lopez.
O'Connor's approach consists of two main elements:
[F]irst, that the federal government must respect state
governments as the seat of autonomous legislative processes
even where the federal government has the power completely

41See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSaf guardsof Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of'the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 547 (1954).
42

See id.

43 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 120 (William

Peden ed., Norton 1972).
See Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution'sForgotten Cover Letter: An Essay
4
on the New Federalismand the OriginalUnderstanding,94 MICH. L. REV. 615,
618 (1995).
41 See id.
46

See id.
at 621-23.
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to preempt state regulation; and, second, that under
M'Culloch v. Maryland the judiciary has the duty to police
Congressional encroachment on the autonomy of the states in
obedience to the spirit of the Tenth Amendment.47
New federalism not only favors dual government, but seems to place
state government above national government by mandating that the federal
government respect state autonomy even in areas where the federal
government is allowed to act and preempt state government actions.
B. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment, while reserving powers to the states, often
has been read as a tautology or a mere truism. 48 That is, the Amendment is
nothing more than a needless repetition of things that already exist. Others
have read it as a true substantive right.49 One author has described the federal
government as "one of enumerated powers .. .and because the Tenth
Amendment reserved all unenumerated powers to the states, state and federal
authorities were absolutely sovereign within their respective spheres of
power."5 Both sides can agree that whether the Tenth Amendment provides
for substantive rights or merely "reserves" power to the states, the wording
of the Tenth Amendment really sheds no light on the type of congressional
actions that unduly interfere with state autonomy. 5 This ambiguity has led

7 H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L.
REV. 633, 693 (1993) (internal footnotes omitted).
48 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (stating that the
Tenth Amendment is a "truism" putting no substantive limits on congressional
power).
49 See HAYEK, supra note 25, at 185-86 (discussing the enumerated protection
given to certain rights by the Bill of Rights).
'oBarry A. Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrinefrom Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 109
(1992).
"' See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy.
Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1988).
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to judge-made law that attempts to define the limits and the powers of the
Tenth Amendment. 2
The problem that emerges is that the Supreme Court has been far from
consistent in defining a limiting principal beyond which national power is
improper. 3 The Court, in more recent opinions, regards the Tenth
Amendment as, if not a true substantive right in itself, then representative of
the division of powers and states' rights to be free from national government
interference. 4
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

The Commerce Clause of the Constitution states that Congress shall
have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with Indian Tribes."55 Much like the Tenth
Amendment, the Commerce Clause is worded clearly on its face, and the
difficulty with its application comes with interpreting those words and also
with the changing interpretation over the years. As with the Tenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause interpretation has been
far from consistent. 6
A. Originalism and the Move Away
If one examines the original intent of the Framers, their Commerce
Clause interpretation is different from the Commerce Clause interpretation
in recent years. Justice Thomas has been a proponent of the original
understanding view that commerce means commerce. He pointed out that,
historically, "'commerce' consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well

52

See id.

" See Alan R. Arkin, Inconsistencies in Modern FederalismJurisprudence, 70
TUL. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1996).
' See generally United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
. U.S. CONST.-art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5 See infra notes 217-32 and accompanying text.
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was used in contradistinction to

productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture.""
The view of Justice Thomas is in accord with an early Supreme Court
decision focusing on the text of the Constitution. 8 Justice Thomas explained
that "commerce" encompasses commodities and the intercourse of such
commodities.59 The Commerce Clause is aimed at allowing Congress to
regulate trade.6" The Framers purpose in drafting the Commerce Clause was
to maintain free trade among the states and to prevent disagreements between
the states that would interfere with interstate commerce. 6'
The Commerce Clause, from an originalist viewpoint, "does not,
however, contemplate congressional regulation of anything that happens to
affect commerce."62 If read so broadly, any activity could be seen to affect
commerce in some way. 3 The Framers, arguably, did not intend the power
to be unlimited. Indeed, the Constitution granted limited powers to Congress
and those powers not given to Congress were reserved for the states. 4 If one
is to read and interpret the Constitution as containing no surplusage, then
under an unlimited Commerce Clause framework, other granted powers in
the Constitution would be unnecessary. For example, if commerce power
applies to anything that affects commerce and not just the instrumentalities,
the bankruptcy power is not needed.65

. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
$ See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-91 (1824).
'9 See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1643.
60

See id.

61

See THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 28-29.
David G. Wille, The Commerce Clause: A Time for Reevaluation, 70 TUL.

6"

L. REV. 1069, 1073 (1996).
6 See id. at 1075.
64 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
" See Wille, supra note.62, at 1076. In addition, the Necessary and Proper
Clause, a critical tool to the broad application of the Commerce Clause, was not
meant to expand the already enumerated powers, such as the Commerce Clause,
but to ensure that Congress had the authority to execute those powers. See id. at
1082-83. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra
note 1, at 154-58 (explaining that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits
Congress to pass laws "within the just bounds of its authority" that are necessary
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The Commerce Clause, under the Supreme Court's interpretation has
not, however, remained as narrow as the Framers' intent.66 Until recently, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause had become very
67
broad in favor of congressional power.
III.

ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE LAW

"Environmentalism" has become a catchall term when speaking of
man's use of and impacts upon the natural world. 8 Environmentalism
possesses a duality in itself when the public is told to "think globally and act
locally" and when there are both state and federal laws aimed at regulating
how individuals may act in relation to particular areas of the environment.
These statutory enactments are aimed at specific goals69 and are often a
compromise among competing interests.70
A. HistoricalOverview of EnvironmentalActivism in the United States

The progress of environmentalism to the present day has come in
stages-what have been referred to as "awakenings."'" When America was
first developing into a new nation, the young country had no cathedrals, no
museums, and no tradition of art. What America did have was its

to the execution of its enumerated powers).
"' See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11

(1942); Guy F. Atkinson v. Oklahoma, 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
" Compare United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) with Garcia,469
U.S. at 528.
68 See THOMAS MORE HOBAN & RICHARD OLIVER BROOKS, GREEN JUSTICE:
THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE COURTS I (2d ed. 1996).
69

70

See id. at 12.

KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE:

READINGS AND COMMENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE 37-41

(1995).

" See REVELLE & REVELLE. supra
note 2, at 2-10.
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wilderness.72 By the 1870s, the vanishing of the wilderness became apparent
enough that Congress began to set aside land, and in 1872, Yellowstone
became the United States' first National Park.73 Preserves were established,
along with the bureaucratic institutions necessary to carry out the
accompanying responsibilities. 74 The next awakening was spurred by the loss
of animal species, exemplified by the extinction of the passenger pigeon in
the early part of this century.75
The next two stages of awakening concerned pollution of drinking
water and contamination of food. 76 Later, during the New Deal, the once
fertile prairies of the Great Plains became known as the Dust Bowl due to soil
erosion and the accompanying desertification of the land. 77 In the middle of
this century, the first air pollution emergency in the United States occurred
in Donora, Pennsylvania.7 8 A little over a decade later, Rachel Carson alerted
79
the public to the crisis of pesticides and contaminants in the environment.
Of all the environmental events in recent years, the one that has involved the
public the most was not a crisis but a signal of the changing environmental

72

71
14

See id.; HOBAN &

BROOKS. supra note 68, at 1.
See REVELLE & REVELLE, supra note 2, at 2.

See id.

"' See id. at 4. The nation's early response to this problem was the creation of

wildlife refuges. See id.
See id. at 5-6. By the early 1900s, United States courts were ordering water
suppliers to provide their contracting cities with pure water through the use of
purification techniques of chlorination and filtration. See id. at 5. In response to
hazardous food additives and unsanitary conditions of stockyards and
slaughterhouses, the United States established agencies to oversee the safety of
the food supply. These functions now come under the authority of the Food and
Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department
of Agriculture. See id. at 6.
76

"' See id. at 6. The government's response to this crisis was the creation of the
Soil Conservation Service to educate farmers about erosion and to promote the
proper farming techniques to prevent such erosion. See id.
78 See id, at 8. In this episode, seventeen people died and hundreds more fell
ill over a 36 hour period due to the effects of smog. See id.
'9 See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); see also REVELLE &
REVELLE, supra note 2, at 8-9.
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consciousness, the first Earth Day in 1970.80
After each of these "awakenings," the government acted in some way
to help ease the problems.8 ' Yet today, there are still the problems of air and
water pollution, desertification of farmland, pesticides and other hazardous
contaminants leaking into groundwater and being discarded improperly, and
the dilemma of nuclear waste. As the world becomes more modem and
industrialized, the predicaments of the old world continue to linger and are
problems that have moved to the forefront of
joined by newer
82
consciousness.
B. The State of Environmental Laws
1. The Legal Perspective on Environmental Conditions
Some of the most well-known and recognizable laws related to the
environment focus on either prevention or remediation, or a combination of
both, in trying to protect the environment and preserve the welfare of the
people. 83 The areas covered by the various environmental statutes seem to be

'0 See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

1970-1990: TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1990) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY REPORT], reprinted in WILLIAM MURRAY TABB & LINDA A. MALONE,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 20(1992).
SI See REVELLE & REVELLE, supra note 2, at 2-9.

Environmentalists have an eye towards creating a "sustainable society" in
which the environment is cared for and drawn upon, but not depleted and
destroyed. The optimistic environmentalists have seen the historical "awakenings" as being staggered and isolated reactions to problems. Now, however, given
modem science and modem awareness, it is the hope that environmental problems
'2

can be dealt with in a unified manner. See REVELLE & REVELLE, supra note 2,

at 10-11.
" For examples of federal laws, see the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§

1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§-1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1994 & Supp. I 1995); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7401-7671q (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 &
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quite comprehensive. The main focus for current environmental problems
includes air pollution, water pollution, noise pollution, wildlife protection,
pesticides, and coastal zone management, in addition to the general goals of
prevention and remediation.84
2. The "Big" FederalEnvironmentalStatutes
The most well-known environmental laws are the federal statutes.
These statutes apply to everyone. States can only vary from the federal
guidelines and regulations in that state environmental protection statutes may
be stricter than the federal laws. 5
The National Environmental Policy Act of 196986 ("NEPA") is now
being seen as the first real step forward as a result of years of activism. 7
Unlike other federal environmental laws, NEPA does not focus on
substantive aspects of environmental harm prevention or remediation.
Instead, NEPA focuses on procedure. "The act was designed primarily to
institutionalize in the federal government an anticipatory concern for the
quality of the human environment, that is, an attitude, a heightened state of
environmental awareness that, unlike pollution abatement, is measurable only
subjectively and qualitatively."88 NEPA has been heralded as a statement on
the United States' environmental ethic.89 NEPA sets out a broad range of

Supp. 1 1995).
" See Jerry L. Anderson, The EnvironmentalRevolution at Twenty-Five, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 395, 396 (1995).
"' See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994 & Supp. I. 1995).
87 See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT at 15, reprintedin TABB & MALONE,
supra note 80, at 211.
8 See id.

See id. Environmental ethics has been described as "the theory concerning
the moral rightness and wrongness of human actions insofar as they affect the
natural environment." Philip H. Hanson, Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS: PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (Philip H. Hanson ed.,
1986). Aldo Leopold was perhaps the first to speak of the need of a "land ethic"
in his SandCounty Almanac. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, AND
89

SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 201-26 (2d ed. 1987):

Attitudes toward the
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policy goals, including the maintenance of "conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony,"9 ° the responsibility of the federal
government to "use all practicable means" to improve federal plans and
programs, 9 ' and the responsibility of the individual.92 Probably the most
important function of NEPA is the requirement on federal agencies to provide
an environmental impact statement on all "proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
"593
environment ....
The Endangered Species Act of 19739' ("ESA") was enacted in order
to set up a conservation program for the ecosystems of endangered and
threatened species.95 In order to further this goal, the ESA prohibits all
"takings" of endangered species by any person." As a result of the broad
implications of the term "taking," the ESA has become a significant control
on land use. 97
In the areas of water and air, the federal government has responded
with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 9 ("FWPCA") and the Clean
Air Act, 99 ("CAA") respectively. The goal of the FWPCA is "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity" of the waters of the

environment and the natural world are shaped by many different social aspects
including Western religion and cultural assumptions, economic institutions,
technology, population growth, and the standard of living. See Ian G. Barbour,
Introduction to WESTERN MAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 1, 1-2 (Ian G.
Barbour ed., 1973).
"o42 U.S.C. § 433 1(a).
91 Id. § 4331(b).
92 See id. § 433 1(c).

"' Id. § 4332(2)(C).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
95 Seeid. § 1531(b).
'4

" See id. § 1538(a)(1).

See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The. Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use
Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1. 1 (1991).
17

9 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
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United States. 0 The CAA, one of the most complex of all environmental
statutes, has the purpose of protecting the quality of the nation's air as well
as preventing pollution. 1 1 Both of these acts accomplish their purposes
through the use of oversight and permit programs.0 2
The goal of the Safe Drinking Water Act0 3 is to provide safe drinking
water to the population via public water systems. 0 4 In order to accomplish
this goal, provisions of the Act provide for maximum allowable
contamination levels and various other regulations.0 5 The SDWA gives the

state primary enforcement responsibility for public water systems, provided
that the state has adopted drinking water regulations at least as strict as the
federal standards and has adopted and implemented procedures for the
enforcement of the Act.106
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 19800' contains the well-known Superfund provisions.
CERCLA's main purpose is to provide remedial action for contaminated
hazardous waste sites.'0 8 The government may clean up sites and then file

§ 125 1(a).
See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)-(c).
102 See id. §§ 7661-7661f; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1345.
103 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
'0o See 33 U.S.C.
101

104

See generally id.

'05 See id. §§ 300g-1 to 300h-8.
0'6See id. § 300g-2(a)(1)-(6).
0'742 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994

& Supp. 1 1995).
" See REVELLE & REVELLE, supra note 2, at 311-12. CERCLA was promulgated as a response to the hazardous waste site at Love Canal in New York. At
Love Canal, a chemical company dumped hazardous waste into what was to have
been a canal. The chemical company then capped the site with clay soil and sold
it to the local school board. Over time, chemicals in the ground leached into the
groundwater. Backyards, swimming pools, and playing fields were found to be
contaminated by the chemicals. In the area, there was a higher than average
incident of birth defects and chromosomal damage. Over 850 families were
moved from the area using federal disaster emergency funds. See id. What Love
Canal showed was how ill-prepared the government was in dealing with
hazardous waste emergencies. See Lois Gibbs & Michael Williams, Grassroots
Action Rather than "Top-Down "Solutions, reprintedin REVELLE & REVELLE,
supra note 2, at 426.
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lawsuits against potentially responsible parties ("PRPs"). 0 9 If PRPs are not
0
found or are insolvent, the Superfund alone pays for the cleanup.°"
3. State EnvironmentalLaws

While federal laws may be the most well-known, the importance of
state environmental laws should not be undercut. States historically have
exercised their police power in regulating many areas that are now considered
part of "environmental law," such as air quality, water quality, and solid
waste disposal."' With the increase in federal regulation, however, many
2
state laws have been preempted." 1
Many states have enacted state environmental quality acts ("SEPAs")
modeled after NEPA." 3 SEPAs require state or local agencies to prepare
environmental impact statements detailing the environmental impacts of
projects that agencies approve or carry out." 4 One example of this type of
state law is the California Environmental Quality Act' '" ("CEQA"). This Act

See 42 U.S.C. § 9612.
H

See id. § 9611.

.

See DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW 5-3 (1996).
"2 See id. at 5-6. This is the result of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause
which provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every States
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

VI, § 2.
'" See generally SELMI

U.S. CONST. art

& MANASTER, supra note 11I, at 10-1 to 10-59. Thus
far, sixteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have enacted
environmental policy acts. The states enacting such legislation are: Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See id. at 10-4 n.4.

'4 See id. at 10-2.
"1
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21178.1 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
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was patterned after NEPA but is stricter in its rules and regulations.' 16 Other
states, as well, have instituted
statutes that go further than the national
7
guidelines."l
and
standards
With respect to air and water pollution, many states had regulations
already in force prior to the existence of the federal statutes.8 One of the
impacts of the CAA is considerable uniformity among the states' air
regulation schemes in meeting the national ambient air quality standards set
by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")." 9 In some states, there
are more stringent regulations for certain pollutants than under federal law. 2 °
State water pollution permit laws are usually in line with the national
provisions.'
In fact, in a number of states, the federal regulations are
adopted specifically.

22

State hazardous waste regulations are newer than air and water
regulations. Much of the current state regulations are byproducts of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976123 ("RCRA") and
CERCLA. 2 4 While states were not the first movers in this area of

..
6 See Nicholas C. Yost, Environmental Impact Assessment Laws, 26

LAND

USE & ENV'T FORUM 204, 204 (1995). One way that CEQA is stricter than
NEPA is the fact that CEQA applies to private as well as government activities.
See id. at 205.
...New York also has a strict environmental policy act. See SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 11, at 10-5.
118 See id. at 8-16.
9See id. at 8-12. 1.
20 Id. at 8-12.1 & nn.37-38 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 70200 (requiring
a more stringent ozone standard for California than the federal statute requires)
and OR. ADMIN. R. § 340-31-050 (regulating certain air pollutants in Oregon not
specifically regulated by federal law)). Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-25(C)(l)(a) (Michie 1978) (disallowing the New Mexico legislature from
promulgating regulations more stringent than federal regulations); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS, § 34A-2-34 (Michie Supp. 1996) (disallowing the South Dakota legislature from promulgating regulations more stringent than federal regulations).
121See id. at 8-14.
22 See id. at 8-15.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
114 See SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 111, at 8-16.
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environmental regulation, with respect to cleanup, the majority of states have
enacted legislation that supplements the federal guidelines and requirements
of CERCLA. 21 "By providing additional funds and enforcement authority,
state cleanup laws give states the ability to respond to hazardous waste sites
in a more timely and comprehensive manner than could be done through
CERCLA alone.'

' 26

IV. HOW THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND COMMERCE CLAUSE FIT
TOGETHER

As indicated by above discussions of the Tenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause, they are frequently discussed together because they depict
complementary aspects of the federal system. Often, if Congress exceeds its
Commerce Clause authority, the Tenth Amendment will have been violated
as well, or at least implicated. 27 Congress may not exceed its enumerated
powers; the Tenth Amendment is a check on this overreaching.
A. The Tenth Amendment
Perhaps the best way to depict the Supreme Court's uncertainty with
the Tenth Amendment is with a brief examination of the evolution of Court's
Tenth Amendment analysis. In an early case, while not commenting directly
on the Tenth Amendment, the Court noted that Congress is "invested with
certain powers" and that Congress is sovereign to the extent of those
powers."' In addition, the Court pointed out that in carrying out these
enumerated powers, Congress can "use all proper and suitable means, not
specifically prohibited."' 29 In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United

125
26
1.7

See id. at 9-4.
Id. at 9-6.
See generally Raoul Berger, JudicialManipulation of the Commerce

Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695, 699 (1996) (stating that because of the Tenth
Amendment, general terms should not be read to override traditional state
jurisdiction); Farber, supra, note 44, at 615.
"8 See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323 (1819).
129 Id. at 324.
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States, the Court stated that even in extraordinary circumstances, Congress
cannot engage in, action that lies outside of its authority, as anticipated and
precluded by the Tenth Amendment.13 ° At this point in time, the Court
viewed Congress' power over its enumerated rights as plenary but also
limited solely to those rights. Any overreaching of federal power was
precluded specifically by the Tenth Amendment. The United States v. Darby
decision recognized Congress' power as plenary, as well as recognizing
The Court,
Congress' ability to use all means to reach a permitted end.'
however, took away the power of their decision with regard to the Tenth
Amendment in stating that the amendment is a mere "truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered."' 3 2 The Court reasoned that the
Amendment was nothing more than a declaration of the federal system of
government that had been established prior to the Amendment's enactment. 133
More recently, while the Court continued to recognize the plenary
power of Congress, the Court distinguished between exercising such full
powers and regulating the states as states. 134 In coming to its decision, the
Court reasoned that states were regulated as states when federal regulations
interfered with "traditional aspects of state sovereignty."'135 This meant that
there could be no federal law that would directly displace the states' right to
structure laws regarding traditional state functions if the federal law was not
among the enumerated powers granted to Congress. 3 ' To do otherwise
would limit the ability of the states "to function effectively in a federal

130

See 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935).

' See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); see also Oklahoma
v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (holding that the Tenth Amendment
did not deprive the federal government from resorting to all means necessary to
exercise a granted power and that whenever state and national constitutional
power conflict, the state must yield).
132 Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
' See id.
114See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
...Id. at. 849.

136See id. at 849-52. Such traditional functions noted by the Court were fire

prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation.
See id. at 852.
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system."'137
The Court continued on this line of thought, with some modifications,
in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 138 where
the Court held that in order for legislation to be set aside, three requirements
must be met: first, the federal statute must regulate "States as States;" second,
the legislation must address matters that are "indisputably attribute[s] of state
sovereignty;" and third, "it must be apparent that states' compliance with the
federal law would directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions."",139 The Court went on to
recognize that if the federal legislation offers the state a choice on being
regulated, then any federal preemption of traditional state functions is
acceptable. 40 Again in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v.
Mississippi,4 ' the Court explained that where an area of law was preemptive
and could come under federal authority, federal regulation of that field was
permissible because it gave the state the choice to either abide by the federal
laws or allow for federal preemption.' 42
Then, the Supreme Court seemed to switch gears with Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 43 The Court overruled National
League of Cities v. Usery144 and dispensed with the rule of drawing
boundaries with "traditional governmental functions" of the states.' 45 Instead
of looking at the functions that the state traditionally performs, the Court
chose to focus on regulating "states as states," and in this situation, it found

7

Id. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 379 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)).

"' 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
"9
Id. at 287-88.

See id. at 288. The Court described this choice of the states in deciding to
regulate or turn the area over to the federal government as "cooperative
federalism." See id. at 289.
14' 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
140

142

See id. at 771.

The Act in question in Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission v. Mississippidid not "compel" exercise of a state's sovereign power.
See id. at 769.
143469
44

U.S. 528 (1985).

426 U.S. 833 (1976).

141See

Garcia,469 U.S. at 538.
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no such regulation in question.'4 6
147

1. New York v. United States

Garcia, however, was not the end of the Tenth Amendment
controversy-enter New York v. United States. In this case, New York
brought an action against the United States challenging provisions of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1985141 ("LRWPA"). At issue
were the disposal of radioactive waste and the proper incentives of the federal
government to encourage states to carry out the federal law."'4 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, recognized the case as presenting a
"constitutional question . . . as old as the Constitution" and involved
"discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal Government
and the States."' 50 The Court took note of Congress' substantial power to
"encourage" states to provide radioactive waste disposal, but
it concluded
that the Constitution does not allow Congress to simply "compel" the states
to do so.'
The LRWPA established a federal policy, holding each state
"responsible for providing, either by itself or in cooperation with other
states,
for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within the state"'152
because waste could be managed the "most safely and efficiently... on a
regional basis."'' 53 In order to encourage state compliance, the Act composed
three types of incentives: monetary, access, and take title. 54 The monetary
incentives consisted of monies collected from surcharges on waste.155 The

'

See id. at 548-55.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
48 Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1985) (codified as amended in scattered

'

sections of 42 U.S.C.).
' See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149.
150Id.
"' See id.

1-242 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(a)(1).
Id. § 2021(d)(a)(1).
114See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 152-54.
'15 See id. at
152.
'"
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Secretary of Energy was to hold these funds and then make payments to the
states that complied with the Act's deadlines.' 56 The access incentives
involved denial of access to already existing disposal sites if the state failed
to meet the deadline of opening up its own disposal sites.' 57 Finally, the take
title provision, which was the most severe of the provisions, stated that "each
state in which such waste is generated ... shall take title to the waste, and

shall be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by such
generator or owner as a consequence of the failure of the State to take
possession ....

"158

Justice O'Connor recognized that the task of determining the correct
balance of power between state and federal governments historically has
taken one of two routes by the Court.' 59 The Court normally has inquired
whether an act of Congress is authorized by one of the enumerated powers in
Article 1. 60 Using the other route, the Court may determine whether an act

of Congress invades the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment.' 6 ' In this case, however, the Court astutely decided that the
inquiries were mirror images of one another. "If a power is delegated to
Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any
reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the
Constitution has not conferred on Congress."' 62 Justice O'Connor then noted
that the limit on congressional power is not derived from the text of the Tenth
Amendment itself, but rather the Tenth Amendment merely confirms that the
power of the federal government is subject to limits that may reserve power

See 42 U.S.C. § 202 1e(d)(2)(a).
7 See id. § 202 1e(e)(2)(c).
Id. § 202le(d)(2)(c).
'5 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 155.
60 See id. Cases utilizing this method of inquiry include Perez v. United
'5

States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) and M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316

(1819).
'° See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 155. Cases having this form of
inquiry include Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) and
Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869).
162 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156.
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163

The Court recognized that the activities that the federal government
sought to regulate with the LRWPA would not have been contemplated by
the Framers because the Framers would not have believed that the federal
government would assume such responsibilities." 4 The Court, however, did
acknowledge that the language of the Constitution is broad enough to allow
for an expansion of federal power. 165 The Court gave examples of the
expanding regulatory authority of the Commerce Clause attributable to the
fact that certain activities have an effect on the national economy. 166 In doing
this, the Court noted that while the scope of the federal government's
167
authority had changed, the underlying constitutional structure had not.
Therefore, the Court held that Congress did have the power to dispose of lowlevel radioactive waste.168 New York and the Court agreed that, indeed, if the
federal government wished, it could preempt state regulation of radioactive
waste. 69 The problem arose with how the federal government directed the
states to regulate.170

The main issue in New York v. United States, then, was under what
circumstances Congress may use the states as "implements of regulation; that
is, whether Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate
in a particular field or a particular way."' 7 ' The Court held that "Congress
may not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.""" However, Congress does not "commandeer" a state in
authorizing the federal government to take over the burdens of implementing

'o'

164
165

See id. at 156-57.
See id. at 157.
See id.

See
See
i68See
169 See
'6

167

171

id. at 158.
id. at 159.

id. at 160.
id.

See id.

Id. at 161.
-72
Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452

'71

U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
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an act when the state fails to do So.113 The Framers chose a constitutional
structure whereby the federal government could regulate individuals directly,
not the states. 74 Such a structure, however, does not prohibit the federal
government from encouraging a state to act in certain ways through different
types of federal incentives that influence a state's policy choices. 175
Congress has the power to regulate activity by offering the states the
choice between either self-regulation or preemption by federal regulation. 76
77
This situation has been termed by the Court as "cooperative federalism.',
It allows citizens of the individual states to retain the ultimate power as to
whether or not the state will comply. Where Congress merely encourages
state regulation and does not compel it, state governments remain responsible78
to the local electorate and the officials remain accountable to the citizens.
This accountability and responsibility is not retained when the federal
government directs the states to regulate. In that situation, the state officials
face the disapproval of the public while federal officials remain insulated
from any sort of accountability.179
In deciding the constitutionality of the three types of incentives, the
Court, in the past, has held that the only real restriction on monetary
incentives is that the conditions must bear some relation to the purpose of the
federal spending. 8° The majority in New York v. United States followed that
approach and found the monetary incentives in New York constitutional
because, in that situation, the states were able to choose whether they would

'
'7
'5

See id.
See id. at 165.
See id. at 166.

See id. at 167 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
"' Id. The Court also cited various programs that engage in this type of cooperative federalism. They include the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 11995); the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); and the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1994).
'71 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
at 168.
7 See id. at 169.
80 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
17,
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be eligible for federal funds or not. 8' As for the access incentives, the states
had the choice of either regulating their residents or allowing their residents
to be subject to federal regulation. 8 2 The states were not "compelled" by
Congress to regulate because if they did not act, the federal government
would. 83
"'
The take title provision in New York v. United States, however, was
subject to a different outcome. This provision required the states to either
regulate according to federal law or take title to the low-level radioactive
waste." 4 Here, "Congress ha[d] crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion."' 85 The Court held that Congress could not order state
governments to take title to waste or to directly order states to regulate
pursuant to federal authority.'8 6 To offer a choice between two options which
Congress lacks the power to offer was no choice at all.' 87 "Either way, 'the
Act commandeer[ed] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."" 8 8
Under this provision, no matter which "choice" the state made, the state still
would be subject to the direction of Congress.' 8 9 The state had no option but
to implement the will of Congress. Such commandeering is inconsistent with
the federal structure of the United States government. 9° While the
Constitution does not allow Congress to require the states to regulate,
Congress can regulate matters directly, and it may preempt state regulation.'19
The Court stated further that the Constitution protects the sovereignty

'8'
'8
'g

See New York v. Unites States, 505 U.S. at 173.
See id. at 175.
See id.

114

See id. at 169.

185
186

Id. at 175.
See id. at 176.

'8'

See id.

,8 Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
"" See id. at 177.
10 See id.
"9'See id. at 178.
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of states for the benefit and protection of individuals.' 92 In addition, where
Congress exceeds its authority, such a departure from the Constitution is not
allowed, even if the states consent.' 93 This type of action would undermine
directly the federal structure of the government and could have the effect of
overlooking the rights of the citizens. In doing this, states would become
mere political subdivisions of the federal government and lose any power that
states as states have under the Constitution.94
The New York v. United States decision has reaffirmed the federal
structure of government and reinvigorated the idea of states' rights.' 95 What
this decision also may have done is set a precedent for striking down, if not
entire federal environmental statutes, at least portions of them. An outcome
similar to the decision in New York v. United States is the decision rendered
in ACORN v. Edwards from the Fifth Circuit.
2. ACORN v. Edwards'96
The main issue in ACORN v. Edwards concerned the Lead
Contamination Control Act of 1988'9' ("LCCA"). The LCCA amended the
Safe Drinking Water Act'98 by targeting lead contamination in drinking water
coolers containing lead solder or lead-lined tanks in schools. This
amendment was meant to remedy the condition of lead contaminated water
existing in the school systems via the water outlets.' 9 Under the amendment,
the EPA and the states shared the responsibility for rectifying this problem.2"'
The states had responsibilities under only two provisions of the LCCA. The

'32

See id. at 181.

id. at 182.
See id. at 188.
195 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:
HistoricalRoots and
ContemporaryModels, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1141-42 (1995).
193 See
"3'4

'9

81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996).

Pub. L. No. 100-572, 102 Stat. 2885 (1988) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ -300j-21 to -26 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
191 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26.
'99 See Edwards, 81 F.3d at 1388.
200 See id.
"9
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first provision stated that "[e]ach State shall provide for the dissemination to
local education agencies, private nonprofit elementary or secondary schools
and to day care centers of the guidance document and testing protocol"
published by the Administrator as well as the list of non-lead free drinking
water coolers provided to the states by the Administrator. 20 ' The other
provision in question stated that "each State shall establish a program ... to
assist local educational agencies in testing for, and remedying, lead
contamination in drinking water from coolers and from other sources .... 202
A separate section provided that the EPA Administrator make grants to the
states to assist them in complying with their mandates.20 3 The main legal
issue was whether the mandates to the states violated the Tenth
Amendment. 2°4 The ACORN v. Edwards decision followed the teachings of
New York v. United States.2 °5
The court in Edwards stated that:
[W]hen an Act of Congress is challenged under the Tenth
Amendment, we must be concerned not only with whether
Congress has the power under Article I to regulate the activity
in question, but also with whether the method by which
Congress has chosen to regulate the activity pursuant to that
power invades that province of state sovereignty protected by
the Tenth Amendment. 6
This rationale was basically a restatement of New York v. United States'
coalescing of the two separate routes courts traditionally had taken in
determining whether an act of Congress was beyond its constitutionally
granted powers.20 7

.01 42 U.S.C. § 300j-24(c).
202

Id. § 300j-24(d).

203 See id. § 220j-25.

." See Edwards, 81 F.3d at 1393.
205 See id. at 1393-95.

0 Id. at'1393.

207 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 155; Edwards, 81 F.3d at 1393.
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In Edwards, the court quickly dispensed with whether Congress had
the power to regulate lead contaminated drinking water coolers under the
Commerce Clause. The court held that Congress did have such power.20 8
Thus, the focus turned to the method of regulation. 20 9 The court stated that
the LCCA provisions in question fell squarely within the ambit of New York
v. United States.2'0 A state's failure to establish the mandated program
subjected the state to civil enforcement proceedings. 21 ' Thus, a state had the
option of either regulating according to congressional will or being forced to
do so through civil action under the LCCA.21 2 This court, like the Supreme
Court in New York v. United States, held this to be "no choice at all. 21 3 Such
"[c]ongressional conscription of state legislative functions is clearly
prohibited under New York's interpretation of the limits imposed upon
Congress by the Tenth Amendment." ' 4 In Edwards, despite valid Commerce
Clause authority to regulate, the states could not be forced to administer
federal programs. 215 The federal government was not allowed to regulate the
states as states.
B. Progressionof the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause has changed progressively from allowing
congressional regulation of commerce to allowing the regulation of
something more. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause authority of Congress extends
not only to the regulations of transactions in interstate commerce, but to the
protection of such commerce from injury. 216 The Court attempted to confine

211See
209 See

Edwards, 81 F.3d at 1393.
id.

See id. at 1394.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a).
See Edwards, 81 F.3d at 1394.
21 See id.

210
21
212

214
211

Id.
See id.

216 295 U.S. 495, 544 (1935).
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this expansion to areas that "directly" affect interstate commerce. 21 7 In
United States v. Darby, the Court further expanded Commerce Clause
authority to include those activities that are intrastate "which so affect
interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce." 218 In addition, the Court introduced the "substantial effects" test
whereby Congress may regulate activities that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.21 9

Perhaps one of the best known examples of broad Commerce Clause
authority is depicted in Wickard v. Filburn, where the Court held that a
farmer, who grew more than the allowed quota of wheat for personal use, was
subject to Commerce Clause regulation.22 ° Commerce Clause authority was
said to extend to those intrastate activities that so affect interstate commerce
so as to make regulation permissible. 22' The Supreme Court in Guv F.
Atkinson v. Oklahoma continued the substantial effects test and introduced
the notion that "[i]t is for Congress alone to decide whether a particular
project, by itself or as part of a more comprehensive scheme, will have such
'
a beneficial effect on the arteries of interstate commerce as to warrant it. 222
A further expansion of Commerce Clause power was the decision in
Katzenbach v. McClung, which rejected the need for Congress to make
formal findings in exercising its power, requiring only a rational basis belief
that something has a "substantial" effect on commerce.223 In addition, the
Court held that Congress could even take "reasonable preventive measures"
in regulating commerce under the auspices of Commerce Clause authority.224
This congressional power of prevention was tempered, however, by the

217 See id. at 546.
218 312 U.S. 100, 118(1941).
239 See id. at 119; see also Oklahoma

(1941).

220 See 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
221 See id. at 125.

22' Guy F. Atkinson, 313 U.S. at 527.
223 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964).
224 Id.at 301.

v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508
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statement that "[t]he activities that are beyond the reach of Congress are
'those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect
other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for225the purpose
of executing some of the general powers of the government."'
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the sister case to
Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court held that "the determinative test of the
exercise of power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply
whether the activity sought to be regulated is 'commerce which concerns
more States than one' and has a real and substantial relation to the national
interest. ' 26 This standard included local activities that might have a
substantial effect upon interstate commerce. 227 These last two cases were
directed at the relationship between the Commerce Clause and racial
discrimination. The Court also found Commerce Clause authority to regulate
loan sharking activities.228
An attack on the ever-increasing power of the national government
finally came in National League of Cities v. Usery, where the Supreme Court
held that there was no Commerce Clause authority in the displacement of
traditional governmental functions.229 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Association, the Court once again looked to the effects on
interstate commerce, and it allowed Commerce Clause authority to extend to
traditional governmental areas because of the federal government's right of
preemption for legitimate ends under the power and authority of the
Commerce Clause. 23' Then, in the Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Authority decision, NationalLeague of Cities was overruled, and the Court
not only found Commerce Clause authority, but dispersed with the traditional

225 Id. at 302 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824)).

226379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964).
127

See id. at 258.

28

See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971).

See Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). Such traditional state functions
include, but are not limited to, fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
221

health, and parks and recreation. See id. at 851.
230

See Hodel, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); see also Federal Energy Regulatory

Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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governmental activities test.23
Up until Garcia, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Commerce Clause authority was very broad and very profederal government. Certain justices, however, were not so satisfied with the
apparent disregard for states' rights and the increasing power of Congress
under the auspices of Commerce Clause authority.232

1. United States v. Lopez

233

United States v. Lopez was the first decision, with the exception of
National League of Cities v. Usery, in which the Court found that Congress
had exceeded its Commerce Clause authority. At issue in Lopez was the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.234 The Act made it a federal offense for
any individual to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone.235 The Court
held that the Act exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority since
possession of a firearm is not an economic activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce. 236 Justice Rehnquist began the majority opinion by
analyzing the constitutional principles of dual sovereigns.23 7 In doing this, the
Court recognized that limitations on Commerce Clause authority not only are
inherent in the Clause itself, but in the Constitution as well. While the Court
did concede that Commerce Clause authority had been increased greatly by
cases such as United States v. Darby2 38 and Wickard v. Filburn,2 39 the Court
stated that this increase in power was due to the fact that earlier cases

2.I
232

See Garcia,469 U.S. 528 (1985).
See e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201-05 (1968) (Douglas, J.,

dissenting); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
774-97 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Garcia,469 U.S. at 579-80 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); id. at 580-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
233 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
234 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).

3 See id. § 922(q)(2)(A).

236 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
237

238

See id. at 1626.
312 U.S. 100(1941).

2,9 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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artificially had constrained the authority granted to Congress. 24" The Court,
however, mitigated this observation with the fact that such Commerce Clause
authority is subject to limits and must be considered in light of our dual
governments.24 '
The Court defined three categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its Commerce Clause power: the use of the channels of
interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 242 The focus
of the Court was on the third category. The Court gave deference to
Congress in requiring only a rational basis for concluding that a regulated
activity substantially affected interstate commerce.243 Despite this deference,
the Court held that the criminal statute was not only unrelated commerce, but
that it was not "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated., 244 This was a regulation that could not be upheld
even when viewed in the aggregate.
In addition, the Court held that the Act contained no jurisdictional
element to ensure, in case-by-case inquiry, that firearm possession affects
interstate commerce.245 This type of element might have "saved" the Act
from a holding of unconstitutionality.246 Such a jurisdictional element would
have been proper and ensured that Congress had not exceeded its Commerce
Clause power. Also, nothing in the legislative history of the Act suggested
congressional findings regarding the effects on interstate commerce of
firearm possession in a school zone.247
The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice

40

See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.

241 See id.
242 See id. at 1629-30. In a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice O'Connor, areas of "traditional state concern" again were given

consideration. See id. at 1638.
241 See id. at 1629.
244 id. at 1630-31.
245 See id. at 1631.
246 See id.
247 See id.
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O'Connor joined, examined the imprecision with which the Court interpreted
the Commerce Clause.2 48 In addition, the concurrence looked at the structural
elements in the Constitution that provide workable standards for the system
of dual sovereigns. 249 Justices Kennedy and O'Connor noted that state
sovereignty was violated here as the result of the federal government's
exceeding its Commerce Clause authority.25 ° The Justices stated that
"[a]bsent a stronger connection or identification with commercial concerns
that are central to the Commerce Clause, that interference contradicts the
federal balance the Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to
1
enforce.

' 25

252
2. United States v. Olin

Following the lead of the Supreme Court in United States v.Lopez in
striking down a congressional act that exceeded the powers delegated to
Congress under the Commerce Clause, the Federal District Court in United
States v. Olin held that EPA's attempt to apply CERCLA to the defendant
also exceeded Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.253 The
defendant, Olin Corporation, owned two sites at which there were alleged
releases of hazardous substances. 254 The EPA listed the Olin sites on the
National Priorities List pursuant to the requirements of CERCLA.255 When
Olin failed to comply with EPA's enforcement, the United States filed suit.25
Olin then claimed that CERCLA was inapplicable because, among other

248

See id. at 1634-37.

249 See id. at 1637.
250 See id. at 1641-42.

2.'Id. at 1642.
252 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
25.See id. at 1533.
254 See id. at 1504.
255 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994).
256 See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1503.
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things, it was violative of the Commerce Clause.257
The court in Olin based its decision on the outcome of Lopez. Judge
Hand, writing for the court, recognized that until Lopez, almost nothing
would have restricted Congress' exercise of commerce power. 25 8 The court
first looked to the New York v. United States259 decision and then to general
principles of federalism and state sovereignty as validation for its opinion.26 °
This approach mirrored the approach in the Lopez decision which focused on
the Constitution's limits on federal power. The court in Olin noted Lopez's
"reassertion that the Constitution's enumeration of powers limits federal
power, that such enumeration '[does] not presuppose something not
enumerated." 26" The court looked at the division of powers between the state
and federal governments and how courts have played an important part in
maintaining the federal structure of government. 26 2 Applying the principle of
enumerated powers as discussed in Lopez, the court found that the application
of CERCLA to this case exceeded the powers granted to Congress under the
Commerce Clause.26 3 The court recognized that Congress may not expand
its enumerated powers; instead, it is bound by the restraints of enumeration
and the Tenth Amendment. 4
Responding to the claim that Lopez was based on a criminal statute
and therefore should be interpreted narrowly, the court in Olin pointed out
that the Supreme Court could have limited its opinion but chose not to do
so.265 Before Lopez, the Supreme Court had construed narrowly federal

211 Olin also claimed that the CERCLA liability provisions should not be retroactive because of a lack of clear legislative intent on retroactive application. See
id. at 1507. The court agreed and held that CERCLA liability was not retroactive. See id. at 1512-19.
25 See id. at 1521.
259 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
" See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1521-22 (noting that New York v. United States

applied Tenth Amendment limitation principles to the Commerce Clause power).
261 Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995)).
262 See id. at 1522-23.
263 See id. at 1523.
214 See id. at 1524.
265 See id. at 1532-33.
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criminal statutes, and thus, it avoided federalism issues.266 The Court in
Lopez directly confronted federalism. As with Lopez, Olin was concerned
with the third category of authorized regulation, activities having a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. 267 Lopez, the District Court
noted, "requires that there be a genuine causal connection between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce. ,268 The court in Olin found no
connection .269

Specifically applying Lopez to CERCLA, the court in Olin
recognized that the Lopez decision required that the statute regulate activity
which substantially affected interstate commerce and that the statute include
a jurisdictional element to ensure that it affected interstate commerce. 270 The
District Court decided that the two plants in question had not operated since
1982 and that the outcome could have been different if the government were
attempting to regulate an operational plant. 27' The court went on to state that
"[w]hile environmental degradation generally may have an effect on interstate
commerce, it is not clear to this court that the degradation at issue in this case
is necessarily 'economic activity' or that it has a 'substantial effect' on
interstate commerce., 27 2 Because real property was in question, the court felt
that this was a state matter falling under the police power of the states.7
Additionally, there was no jurisdictional element providing for a case-by-case
inquiry into the effect on interstate commerce. 274 At issue was a discharge on

266 See id. at 1530.
267 See id. at 1531.
26.Id. The court pointed

out that in so requiring, the Court is more faithful to

Chief Justice Marshall's means-ends analysis in M'Culloch v. Maryland. In
M'Culloch, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819).
29 See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1532.
70 See id.
271 See id. at
272

Id.

273 See id.
274 See id.

1533.

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[21:735

real property that allegedly had contaminated a local alluvial aquifer, with no
evidence of migration across state lines.275
C. Linking of the Edwards and Olin Decisions
As with the New York v. United States and United States v. Lopez
decisions of the Supreme Court, theACORN v. Edwards and United States
v. Olin decisions continued the movement away from a national power
structure into greater concern for states' rights. As noted above, the Lopez
decision was the first decision in over fifty years to hold that, despite strong
national interests to the contrary, Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause
authority. In addition, the earlier New York v. United States decision seemed
to be the first step in the heralding a new era of federalism in the Supreme
Court and elsewhere. New York v. United States was the first decision in
which Justice O'Connor was able to promote and explain her view of
federalism that first, "the federal government must respect state governments
as the sear of autonomous legislative processes

. . .

, and second,

. . .

the

judiciary has the duty to police Congressional encroachment . "..."276
The first element means that Congress must give states a choice; it
must allow states to act as they wish in a particular field or to regulate the
field themselves.277 Because the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment often are linked together in their treatment of federalism issues,
the concurrence in Lopez referenced the principles of Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in New York v. United States, a Tenth Amendment case.278
Likewise, the lower court decisions of ACORN v. Edwards and United States
v. Olin relied on these decisions as well. In each of the lower court decisions,
both the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment were discussed by the

275 See id.
2,7

Powell, supra note 47, at 639.

See id. at 641.
271See United States

277

concurring)

v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1637-42 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
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judges before they reached conclusions similar to the Supreme Court's.27
D. Effect on EnvironmentalLaw
The effect these decisions will have on environmental law is
questionable. It seems that under Tenth Amendment analysis, as in the New
York v. United States and ACORN v. Edwards decisions, so long as states are
not forced to abide by federal law with no real alternative to not following it,
the law seems to be safe fiom challenge. Consequently, state encouragement
is allowed even though regulation is not. Justice O'Connor, writing for the
Court in New York v. United States, stated that Congress may not simply
"commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling
280
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.,
After New York v. United States, the federal government was left with
traditional constitutional enticements, such as monetary, incentives, to
encourage state compliance. Under its spending power authority, for
instance, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds so
long as the conditions "bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal
spending."2 8 ' In addition, Congress is free to regulate private activity by
offering "[s]tates the choice of regulating that activity according to federal
standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation., 2 8 2 This is in
harmony with the federal design in which states may not be regulated by the
national government, but individuals may be.283
The types of incentives that the federal government is allowed to

279 See generally Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996); Olin, 927 F. Supp.

1502.

505 U.S. 144, 170 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). The problem with the statute in
New York v. United States was that its take title provision directly compelled
states to regulate pursuant to national command. See Percival, supra note 195,
at 1166.
2" New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 167 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).
280

282 Id. at 145.
281 See id. at 165.
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impose have been used widely in federal environmental laws with no
infringement on states' rights. 84 As a result, both the states and national
governments have retained control consistent with the ideal of a separation
of powers. Any effects a New York v. United States type of Tenth Amendment analysis may have on environmental law should be minimal. The
federal government is free to impose monetary, access, and other types of
incentives to encourage the states to follow the wishes of the national
government, but the states remain free to choose their own paths. In the
context of environmental law, New York v. United States signaled a "greater
willingness on the part of the Court to assert judicially enforceable limits on
federal authority ....285

The Commerce Clause decisions are more problematic with regard to
current environmental laws, particularly in light of United States v. Lopez.
One area of concern are statutes regulating hazardous waste sites, specifically
CERCLA. The problem with CERCLA is that it, at times, seeks to regulate
hazardous waste sites entirely within the individual states. 86 While even
local activities may be regulated if they have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, the question is, how do hazardous waste sites affect commerce?
Hazardous waste, itself, can be moved in interstate commerce, but the sites
themselves cannot. In determining whether hazardous waste site contamination could affect commerce, the outcome may depend on whether one
examines the site alone or together with the possible far-reaching effects of
the site.
The main problem that emerges for courts after United States v. Lopez
287
is how to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial activity.

In looking to Lopez for guidance, the test suggested by the Court is whether
the statute, in this case CERCLA, regulates the use of channels of interstate
commerce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or activities with a
substantial relation to interstate commerce.288 CERCLA arguably fits into the

214

215

286
27
288

See Percival, supra note 195, at 1166.
Id. at 1167.
See generally United States v. Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
See Percival, supra note 195, at 1170.
See United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995).

1997]

COMMERCE CLAUSE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTALISM

775

third category. CERCLA, like the act at issue in Lopez, by its terms has
nothing to do with commerce or any other kind of economic enterprise.28 9
Therefore, it appears that Congress lacks the constitutional power to regulate
wholly intrastate activities, at least absent some sort ofjurisdictional element.
To allow Congress the power to regulate something that may affect
commerce would venture back to the pre-Lopez decisions of the Court which
grant Congress broad authority while disregarding states' rights.29 °
If Congress lacks the power to enforce CERCLA because it may not
regulate commerce, then the states are left to regulate themselves. As noted
in the discussion in Part III, states have been active in pursuing environmental
laws on their own, in many cases before the federal government began
enacting environmental statutes. 29' However, state hazardous waste regulations are generally byproducts of federal laws.292 Still, this does not
indicate necessarily that without application of CERCLA to wholly intrastate
activities, there would be severe environmental degradation. In fact, the
majority of states have enacted legislation that supplements CERCLA in
order to respond faster and to clean-up sites more thoroughly.2 93 So, at least
with regard to hazardous waste, refusal to apply CERCLA to wholly
intrastate sites does not indicate that states would engage in a "race to the
2 94
bottom" in enacting and enforcing environmental protection laws.
E. Environmental Goals
In advancing the goals of environmentalism and promoting any type
of environmental ethic, however, it does seem that federal laws make more

R9 See
291 See
29' See
292 See
2193
See

294

id. at 1631.
supra text accompanying notes 216-32.
supra Part III.B.3.
SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 111, at 8-16.
id. at 9-4, 9-6.

In the air quality context, the states' "race to the bottom" to attract pol-

luting-albeit revenue producing-businesses was Congresses frequently invoked
justification for preempting less stringent state air quality standards. See John P.
Dwyer, The Practiceof Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV.
1183, 1195 (1995).
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sense. Federal laws allow for a unification of standards while leaving states
free to adopt stricter standards than are provided at the national level. Federal
laws allow for uniformity of approach and consistency in application. To
require a jurisdictional element in federal laws such as CERCLA in order to
determine whether the contaminated site at issue is wholly intrastate would
be both costly and time-consuming. One could imagine the emergence of
battling experts trying to determine if waste had contaminated the
groundwater and then whether the groundwater is confined solely to one
particular state. In addition, from an environmental perspective, site
contamination could be considered to substantially affect commerce in that
such contamination could affect immigration, emigration, and tourism. If
states are free to regulate themselves, then while it may be true that each state
may not engage in a "race to the bottom," if certain states do, that could be
harmful enough from an environmental perspective.
In addition, if the true stated values of American society-that is,
following the will of the people-are to be adhered to, federal environmental
laws are the best approach to preventing and remedying environmental
problems. The majority of "Americans continue to believe that the federal
government should have more responsibility for environmental protection
' If the United States is to act as a unified body, promoting
than the states."295
a national environmental ethic, reversing national laws would be more
detrimental to such a feat than productive. The federal laws serve to promote
nationally important interests.296
V. CONCLUSION

Recently, the Supreme Court has moved away from allowing federal
government power to ever-increase. It has been accomplishing this goal via
the enumerated powers in Article I of the Constitution. The Court supports
a states' rights movement to bring power back to the local governments and

295
296

Percival, supra note 195, at 1144.
See id. at 118 1.
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away from the federal government.297 The Supreme Court has looked to the
Federalist Papers and to the origin of the federal structure of government in
order to determine just how far Congress may go in regulating vis-a-vis the
enumerated powers granted by the Constitution. Environmentalism seems
secure in that, so long as states are not mandated by the federal government,
the Tenth Amendment will not apply and oust federal law from state domain.
The Commerce Clause cases, however, present a problem for environmentalism and environmental laws. Since United State v. Lopez, the Court appears
intent on limiting congressional regulation unless there is really "commerce"
or activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Therefore, from a
constitutional and legal standpoint, laws such as CERCLA may be in trouble
in this regard. From an environmental standpoint, however, this could be
tragic. If states alone are to legislate and determine laws, what will happen?
While Americans do tend to be very aware of environmental
problems, the fact is that, as with other problems, such as poverty, lack of
adequate housing, education, and work, environmental problems often are
pushed aside in favor of more pressing day-to-day concerns. If states are to
act and protect the environment, citizens need to take a more active part in
demanding that local governments hear and respond to their demands for
environmental regulation and protection. Apart from state laws, federal laws
need jurisdictional requirements, or the Court needs to swing back to an
earlier Commerce Clause analysis, reading commerce more broadly than the
Court in United States v. Lopez.
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